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Old age pension decision
Out of sync with legal developments
Lilian Chenwi and Siyambonga Heleba
Christian Roberts and Others v Minister of Social Develop-
ment and Others Case No. 32838/05 (TPD) [Christian Rob-
erts case]
On 17 March 2010, the North Gauteng High Court 
finally handed down judgment in the Christian 
Roberts case, which the Court had heard on 11 
and 12 September 2007. It concerns a constitu-
tional challenge to section 10 of the Social Assist-
ance Act 13 of 2004 and the relevant regulations, 
which set the age for accessing the old age grant 
at 60 for women and 65 for men.
The facts of the case and the arguments of the applicants 
and respondents were stated and discussed in detail in an 
earlier issue of the ESR Review (Heleba, 2007). Basically, 
the applicants (who were four males above the age of 60 
but below 65 at the time of the application) challenged the 
differentiation on the ground that it violated the equality 
clause and the right of access to social assistance, both 
guaranteed by the Constitution (sections 9(3) and 27(1)(c), 
respectively). The government argued that the differentia-
tion was not unfair as it was aimed at addressing inequali-
ties faced by women in general, and particularly African 
women during apartheid, such as race, class and social 
discrimination (para 17). The Community Law Centre, the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies and the South African 
Human Rights Commission intervened jointly as friends of 
the court (amici curiae) in the case.
Following the hearing of the case, the government 
made a dramatic legislative change to progressively equal-
ise the age at which men and women receive their old age 
pension. The Social Assistance Act was amended so that 
men aged above 60 years would access social grants at 
progressively lower ages from 2008 until 2010: namely, at 
63 by April 2008 and 61 by April 2009, ultimately achiev-
ing equality with women, at 60, by April 2010. The govern-
ment thus responded positively to the applicants’ claims 
over two years ago.
The issues
The following questions were put to the Court:
whether the discrimination referred to above was rea-• 
sonable, fair and justifiable in a democratic system;
whether to amend the discriminatory statute if it found • 
the discrimination to be unfair; and
whether the government could afford to extend social • 
grants to men between the ages of 60 and 64.
The decision
In respect of the first question, the Court held that there 
was no doubt that the challenged provisions were discrimi-
natory, as they favoured women and discriminated against 
men (para 26). In answering the question, the Court relied 
on the Constitutional Court’s decision in Jooste v Score 
Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) [Jooste], 
where the Court had outlined an approach to follow in 
dealing with claims alleging an infringement of section 
9(1) and (2) of the Constitution. In the Jooste case, it was 
stated that the first question to ask was whether there was 
a rational relationship between the differentiation and a 
legitimate government purpose (para 28). If no such re-
lationship could be established, then the differentiating 
scheme was in breach of the provisions mentioned. But if 
such relationship did exist, then the next question to ask 
was whether the differentiation (discrimination) was un-
fair. Finally, if the differentiating scheme was found to be 
unfair in terms of section 9(3), it had to be asked whether 
the impugned measure could be saved by section 36 of the 
Constitution (the limitation clause).
According to the Court, Africans had generally suffered 
under the apartheid regime. Women in particular had been 
further marginalised by social structures and stereotypes 
(para 29). Consequently, because women had suffered the 
most disadvantage, it was imperative that government 
preferred women over their male counterparts aged 60, 
in its efforts to rid society of the legacy of apartheid (para 
30).
The Court sought further guidance from the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision in Minister of Finance and Another 
v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC), arguably the leading 
authority on equality. In that case, the Court outlined a 
three-pronged inquiry in answering a constitutional chal-
lenge based on section 9(1) and (2). The questions to ask 
were, firstly, whether the challenged measure targeted 
persons or categories of persons previously disadvan-
taged by apartheid; secondly, whether the measure was 
designed to protect and advance such disadvantaged 
persons or class of persons; and, thirdly, whether the chal-
lenged scheme promoted the achievement of equality. In 
the present case, the Court found the discrimination to be 
fair on the basis that it was necessary and reasonable to 
address and protect women since they had been the most 
disadvantaged and marginalised during apartheid (paras 
35–37).
Regarding the second question put to the Court in the 
Christian Roberts case – namely, whether it should amend 
the discriminatory statute if it found it to be unfair – the 
Court simply held that courts should refrain from stepping 
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into the legislative jurisdiction to create or amend statutes, 
and must respect the separation of powers (para 39).
Regarding the third question, and in response to an ar-
gument by the applicants and amici that the government 
could afford the financial burden resulting from equalising 
the old age pension, the Court held that it was the prerog-
ative of government to determine its financial resources 
and the deployment thereof (para 40). Furthermore, the 
Court accepted the government’s contention that it could 
not afford the equalisation (para 40).
The Court then dismissed the application with costs 
against the applicants and the amici (para 41).
Some concerns with the decision
This is a troubling decision, because it seeks to uphold a 
dead legislative scheme. Moreover, the decision seeks to 
give effect to rights in the Constitution, yet ignores a leg-
islative development that seeks to give effect to constitu-
tional rights. The case was heard nearly three years ago. 
Since then, there has been a fundamental legislative devel-
opment that effectively renders the key challenge moot. 
The government, after the hearing, decided to amend the 
contentious legislation so as to extend access to old age 
grants to the excluded class of persons on a progressive 
basis. This development essentially made the judge’s task 
so much easier. It is very likely that the amended legisla-
tion was not subsequently put before the Court by any of 
the parties, which thus explains the Court’s overlooking of 
it. However, a court should not ignore relevant legislation 
when giving effect to the Constitution. It is therefore un-
fortunate that the Court did not take it upon itself to con-
sider the legislative development.
An important aspect of the decision, and perhaps the 
most negative one, is the Court’s costs order against the 
applicants and the amici without hearing them on the is-
sue and without the government seeking costs against the 
amici in its submissions. This was not entirely unexpected, 
given the court’s rather strong language: ‘The amici curiae, 
in essence, had ganged with the applicants against the re-
spondents … and they should be regarded as having failed 
in their quest, thus attracting costs against them’ (para 
41). The decision ignores constitutional jurisprudence 
from several cases providing that as a general rule in con-
stitutional matters, costs should not be issued against pri-
vate litigants who raise constitutional claims against the 
state, or against an amicus curiae, regardless of the side it 
joins. (See, among other cases, Women’s Legal Centre Trust 
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 
(6) SA 94 (CC) para 32; Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic 
Resources and Others 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) at paras 22–25; 
Mohunram and Another v National Director of Public Pros-
ecutions and Another 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC) at para 105; Hoff-
man v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 63.); 
The government should therefore as a general rule bear its 
own costs when resisting a constitutional challenge.
Quite correctly, the amici and applicants have submit-
ted applications for leave to appeal against the court’s cost 
order.
Conclusion
Based on legislative developments after the hearing of the 
case that extended old age grants to the aggrieved class of 
persons progressively, the case has effectively been ren-
dered inconsequential. The decision is a very negative con-
tribution to the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights 
in South Africa and especially the jurisprudence on who 
bears costs in constitutional litigation. The Court appears 
to be raising a red flag to socio-economic rights adjudica-
tion in general, and public interest litigation in particular, 
by awarding a punitive costs order against the amici. The 
approach of the Court in relation to costs is unfortunate in 
a country where litigation is beyond the means of its poor 
majority and public interest litigation fills a crucial void and 
remains the poor’s best hope of a better life.
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